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Abstract 
Samahon-Oumar, M. Gulam, June 1991 Business 
Influence of Shareholder Concentration on Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) compensation: Empirical Evidence (16 pp.) 
Director: Patricia P. Douglas 
The purpose of this research is to replicate and confirm the work of Santerre and 
Neun [1986] by utilizing more recent data in examining the relationship between 
degree of stockholder control and Chief Executive Officers' (CEOs') compensation. 
The Santerre-Neun study is a cross-sectional analysis of CEOs' cash salaries and 
bonuses for 1980. However, the empirical results from this study support their 
finding that an inverse relationship exists between the degree of stockholder 
concentration and CEO compensation and further, offering stock ownership to 
CEOs', contingent upon firm performance, is a valuable mechanism for firms to 
consider. The authors also found that the level of executive compensation is partly 
influenced by the degree of stock dispersion for firms which possess some degree 
of momopoly power. This study consists of 89 firms in the Steel, Petroleum, Drug, 
and Chemical industries for 1986. 
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INFLUENCE OF SHAREHOLDER CONCENTRATION ON CHIEF 
EXECUTIVE OFFICER (CEO) COMPENSATION: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
I. Introduction 
Yearly publications of total remuneration packages earned by corporate Chief 
Executive Officers' (CEOs') and the degree of shares owned by them reported in the 
business press have become a matter of public concern and scrutiny. It is indeed 
plausible for some readers to look casually at CEO compensation totals and infer that the 
CEOs' are overpaid or underpaid, while others will be more analytical and take a closer 
look at these data. Consequently, shareholders may be even more concerned that CEOs' 
act in the shareholders' interest and that CEOs' remunerations reflect performance. 
Stock ownership is an important means by which the managers are induced to act 
in the shareholders' interest [Benston, 1985]. One important base for measuring CEOs' 
competence is an assessment of the degree to which their decision-making has directly 
resulted in maximizing shareholders' wealth. Murphy [1985] posits that as measured 
by the rate of return on common stock, a strong, positive statistical relationship exists 
between executive pay and company performance. According to economic theory, 
managers (CEOs') are assumed to act in the best interest of shareholders by utilizing firm 
resources to maximize profits; hence, CEOs' are referred to as "profit maximizers." 
However, managers often tend to digress from the shareholder wealth maximization 
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criterion by focusing managerial decisions on attaining personal goals at the expense of 
shareholders. Consequently, a broader assessment base is needed. 
Market performance provides a broad base because corporate decisions are 
constantly being analyzed by the market, particularly their effect on future cash flows 
which is reflected in a firm's current share price. Conversely, using share price 
movements as a basis for CEO compensation causes problems. Stock prices are often 
affected by factors beyond the control of the CEO, and thus will greatly increase CEOs' 
exposure to risk. For example, the stock price may well be influenced by the overall 
state of the economy and stock market. If a performance measure is utilized to assess 
an executive, he or she should have a reasonable degree of control over the results being 
measured. 
During the 1950s and 1960s stock options, which was a major component of 
executive compensation packages, was a reliable mechanism in aligning the interest of 
shareholders and management [Rappaport, 1986]. But due to poor stock market 
performances in the 1970s, stock option plans proved to be substantially less valuable and 
many executives opted not to exercise their options. However, in the 1980s stock 
options have been a visible component of CEO compensation packages. The re-
emergence of stock options in the 1980s as a major component in CEO compensation 
may be partly due to the overall performance of the stock market and the economy. 
Whether stock price provide a good basis of compensation is unclear from empirical 
research. Coughlan & Schmidt [1985] found that a strong, positive correlation exits 
between changes in executive compensation and stock price performance (adjusted for 
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marketwide price changes), while Ciscel & Carrol [1980] posit that the base salary 
received by management is determined through the interaction of supply and demand. 
The ownership structure of a firm has a direct impact on the activities of CEOs 
and acts as a mechanism in aligning the activities of CEOs' [Benston, 1986]. The 
degree of corporate control has a direct influence on the level of compensation earned 
by CEOs [Santerre & Neun, 1986]. Dyl [1988] suggests the levels of management 
compensation are related to the degree to which a firm is closely held because major 
shareholders have a meaningful economic incentive to engage in monitoring activities of 
the manager. But, Neun & Santerre [1986] suggest that the ability of the dominant 
shareholder to exert increasing amounts of partial control over management gradually 
increases as the percentage of the stock owned by the dominant shareholder(s) rises. 
The purpose of this study is to replicate Santerre and Neun's [1986] theoretical 
model and to examine its validity with more recent data. Therefore, this study tests the 
hypothesis that the level of executive compensation is partly influenced by the degree of 
stock dispersion for firms which possess some degree of monopoly power. 
This study uses, similar to Santerre and Neun's [1986] study, a Herfmdahl index 
of stock dispersion to indicate the degree to which a company is owned by a few 
powerful stockholders. The index can take a value between zero and ten thousand. 
When a firm's shareholdings are dispersed among many shareholders, with no single 
and/or group of shareholders owning a significant amount of shares, the index takes on 
a value towards the lower spectrum of the index. A dispersed ownership structure 
deprives any single owner of the ability to monitor and discipline the movements and the 
4 
strategic decision-making horizons of the CEO because it will be too costly to monitor. 
Recognizing the absence of shareholders with significant control over voting rights, 
CEOs' could deviate from shareholder wealth maximization goals and seek personal goals 
at the expense of shareholders which would be detrimental to the firm. 
Consequently, when the shareholdings are owned by a powerful few, the index 
takes on a value towards the upper spectrum of the index indicating concentration of 
ownership. When the corporate stock ownership is owned by a few shareholders, the 
CEO will be cognizant of the power groups that control the voting rights of the firm and 
act accordingly; corporate power is likely to rise incrementally as the dominant 
fraction(s) of the outstanding stocks come(s) closer to owning 51% of the stock.1 
Furthermore, the CEO can be monitored better when the share ownership of a company 
is concentrated among a few shareholders. The Herfmdahl index of stock dispersion 
captures the concentration of share ownership among a few powerful individuals or many 
owners at a given point in time. 
II. The Empirical Model 
This study investigates the relationship between CEO compensation and a firm's 
shareholder concentration identified by the Herfmdahl index. The empirical model takes 
the following form: 
R = Bo + B1 LASSETS + B2 PRATE + B3 LHERF + e (1) 
1. See [Neun & Santerre, 1986]. 
5 
where 
R = Cash salary and bonus for CEOs' in 1986. 
LASSETS = Natural logarithm of the average of total assets for the period 
1984-1986. 
PRATE = Average of profit rate (accounting profits divided by sales) for the 
period 1984-1986. 
LHERF = Natural logarithm of the Herfmdahl index of stock dispersion for 
1986. 
e = Error term 
The hypothesis is that a firm's total assets will be positive (B1 > 0). Prior 
studies have indicated that the assets of a firm are positively related to CEO 
compensation, Abraham [1988] and Dyl [1988]. Finkelstein & Hambrick [1989] 
postulates that bigger firms tend to pay more compensation because the CEO oversees 
substantial resources, rather than because of the firms' ability to pay more or because of 
their number of hierarchical pay levels. The accounting profit rate indicates the CEO's 
ability to direct the activities of the company profitably. Lewellen & Huntsman [1970] 
suggest that profitability is more important than sales in determining executive 
compensation. Therefore, the parameter estimate PRATE, the average of accounting 
profit rate, is expected to be positive (B2 > 0). 
The Herfmdahl index is computed as follows: 
HERF= Y, (Si)2 (2) 
1*10 
where Si is the percentage of the firm's outstanding shares that are held by the ten largest 
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shareholders.2 Although the construction of the Herfmdahl index is slighdy different 
from Santerre and Neun's [1986], the index measures the degree to which the 
stockownership is concentrated. The construction of the Herfmdahl index is followed 
according to Koch [1980]. 
When each stockholder in the top ten owns a large percentage of the outstanding 
shares, each one has the incentive and the power to foster managerial decision making 
that will be in the shareholders' interest. The Herfmdahl index enter the model in log-
form, to comply with the Santerre/Neun theoretical model, and is hypothesized to have 
an inverse relationship with CEO compensation, hence, the parameter LHERF is 
expected to be negatively correlated with R, cash salaries and bonuses of CEOs, 
(B3 < 0). 
Data for CEO total cash salaries and bonuses were derived from the Forbes 
Magazine.3 Data regarding total assets and profit rate were derived from the Compustat 
PC-Plus data base. Lastly, data for the Herfmdahl index were derived from the 
Disclosure data bank. The sample of firms includes 89 Fortune 500 firms: in the Steel 
industry (n = 10), Petroleum industry (n=29), Chemical industry (n=26), and Drug 
2. Santerre & Neun [1986] used a different computation to construct the Herfmdahl 
index. Their index was computed as follows: E (Pi/.51) ~2, where Pi is the percentage of the 
firm's outstanding shares that are held by the ith largest shareholders such that the sum of Pi's 
is equal to 51% (majority control). Based on their procedure, the index can take on a value 
between zero and one. The index is equal to one if a single shareholder has majority control 
of the firm and approaches zero as the number of shareholders increases and as shareholdings 
become more equally distributed among a given number of shareholders. 
3. Forbes (1987: 162-205). 
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industry (n=24).4 In 1986, the time of data collection, all the companies were held 
publicly and listed in the Fortune 500. Most firms had more than one SIC-Code due to 
their diversification strategies; hence, the companies were picked according to their 
industry-specific SIC-Code. 
HI. Empirical Results 
The results of the regression model (1) described above are shown in Table 1. 
The ownership concentration variable (i.e. the natural logarithm of the Herfmdahl index 
of stock dispersion) is significant at the .05 level and has the anticipated negative 
relationship to the level of cash salaries and bonuses earned by CEOs'. This result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the level of executive compensation is partly 
influenced by the degree of stock dispersion for firms which possess some degree of 
monopoly power. 
The other coefficients in the regression model, namely total assets and profit rate, 
have the anticipated positive relationship with the dependent variable, cash salaries and 
bonuses of CEOs', but only total assets is significant at the .01 level while profit rate, 
although positive, lacks statistical significance even at the .10 level. Thus, CEO 
compensation was based largely on the firm size and the degree of stockownership in 
4. These are the same industries Santerre & Neun [1986] investigated in their study 
and these industries were perceived as oligopolistic and having either "very high" or 
"substantial" barriers to entry. 
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1986. 
Although earlier studies [Cooley & Edwards, 1982] have found that the profit 
rate was a determinant and a significant variable in assessing managerial compensation, 
results of this study suggest that it is insignificant in this model. Perhaps in 1986 
compensation committees were advocating value and growth creation as parameters for 
CEO performance assessment and compensation, as opposed to the accounting profit rate 
that may have been one of the basis for assessing cash salaries and bonuses for CEOs' 
in 1980. On average the CEOs' in 1986 earned a cash salary and bonus of $775,438 and 
the Herfmdahl index of stock dispersion on average had a value of 340 for the same 
year. 
The results of regression analyses based on the theoretical model (1) for the 
chemical, drug, petroleum, and steel industries are shown in Table 2. The model is 
significant in the drug industry and a relatively high proportion of the variance in CEO 
cash salary and bonus is explained by the right-side variables. Further, all the 
independent variables in the drug industry have their hypothesized values, but, only the 
average of total assets is significant at the .01 level. Compared to other industries 
included in this study, on average, the highest cash salary and bonus is earned in the 
Chemical industry ($845,269) while the lowest is in the Petroleum industry ($759,621). 
Further, on average, the Steel industry has the highest Herfmdahl index, which means 
the ownership structure in the Steel industry is highly concentrated relative to the other 
industries. The Petroleum industry, on average, has the highest total assets and the Drug 
industry, on average, has the highest accounting profit rate. 
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The overall regression model (1) for the whole sample of firms representing four 
different industries is significant at the .01 level and has a coefficient of determination 
(R-Squared Adjusted) of .4459. Given that this study uses a cross-sectional analysis, 
collectively the model explains a significant proportion of variance in CEO cash salary 
and bonus, which is quite high for a study of this nature. 
From Table 1, ceteris paribus, the partial relationship between a change in the 
Herfmdahl index of stock dispersion (ALHERF) and a change in the cash salaries and 
bonuses earned by the CEOs (AR) may be expressed as follows: 
AR = -91.0437 (ALHERF) (4) 
This same relationship can be expressed in percentage terms as follows: 
AR = -.11740 (ALHERF) (5) 
simply by dividing equation (4) by the mean level of CEO cash salary and bonus for 
1986, $775,438,5 so that AR is the average percentage change in compensation 
associated with a change in the Herfmdahl index. This implies that a 1 % increase in the 
Herfmdahl index is associated with a 11.74% reduction in CEO cash salary and bonus. 
The most important point in this study is that the results of the model (1) 
demonstrates that the Herfmdahl index of stock dispersion is inversely related to CEO 
salaries and bonuses as hypothesized in the Santerre & Neun [1986] study and is 
5. Mean Min Max 
a) LHERF 2.557 1.64 3.99 
b) LASSETS 3.480 2.40 4.83 
c) SALARY & 
BONUS 775.438 200.00 1577.00 
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statistically significant. 
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
The influence of the structure of stockownership of a firm on the level of cash 
salary and bonus earned by CEOs' is an important conceptual linkage in the incentive 
argument which is common in accounting and economic research. Neun & Santerre 
[1986] contend that a minimum of 17% to 19% stockownership is required by the 
dominant stockholder before being able to exert a minimal amount of control over 
managers. 
Most Fortune 500 firms offer incentives such as stock options (SO) and stock 
appreciation rights (SAR) contingent upon firm performance. When the firm reaches its 
corporate goals, the CEO is compensated according to their contractual agreement. 
When the CEOs' exercise the SOs and SARs, they become part owners of the firm. 
Rewarding CEOs by offering part ownership in the firm, contingent upon firm 
performance, is a valuable mechanism for corporate compensation committees to 
implement. Shareholders thereby secure CEOs' commitment to maximize shareholder 
wealth by offering stock ownership. Ownership also acts as a means of "bonding" 
executives to their firms [Eaton & Rosen, 1983]. 
To test empirically if such incentives as stock ownership influenced CEO salaries 
and bonuses in 1986, a separate regression was performed. The regression used the 
following variables: average of total assets (1984-1986; LASSETS), Herfmdahl index of 
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stock dispersion (1986: LHERF), and shareholdings by CEOs (1986:CEO-OWN) as 
independent variables. Results of the regression are presented in Table 3. The variable 
LHERF and variable CEO-OWN have negative relationships with the dependent variable, 
CEO Salaries and Bonuses, the former significant at the .05 level and the later significant 
at the . 10 level. The results imply that when ownership is offered to the CEO in the 
company and when the share ownership structure is concentrated among a few powerful 
individuals, the CEOs' are paid less compensation. The total assets variable has a 
positive relationship with the dependent variable and is significant at the .01 level; 
indicating that the size of the firm contributes significantly towards CEOs' salaries and 
bonuses. The overall model is significant at the .01 level (F-Ratio= 25.126) and 
explains 45% of the variance in cash salaries and bonuses for 1986. 
Cash compensation (i.e., salary plus bonus) was used as a measure of CEO 
compensation to comply with Santerre and Neun's [1986] study. Consequently, this 
measure excludes the consideration of the whole remuneration package usually presented 
to CEOs'; however, Benston [1985] and surveys by Booz, Allen, and Hamilton [1983] 
and Hay Associates [1981] report salaries and bonuses represent between 80% to 90% 
of total remuneration.6 The findings of this study confirms Santerre & Neun's [1986] 
contention that an inverse relation exists between the degree of stockholder control and 
executive compensation and further, offering stock ownership to CEOs', contingent upon 
firm performance, is a valuable mechanism for firms to consider. 
6. See Lambert & Larcker [1985]. 
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Table 1 
14 
Regression Results: Cash Salary & Bonus for the CEOs in the Chemical, Drug, 
Petroleum, and Steel industries (1986). 
Independent Estimated Coefficients 
Variables (T-ratio) 
INTERCEPT -367.5705 
(-1.460) 
LASSETS 383.7520 
(7.652)* 
PRATE 450.2808 
(1.546) 
LHERF -91.0437 
(-1.809)** 
R-Squared Adjusted = .4459 
F-Ratio = 24.611 * 
N = 89 
Dependent Variable = CEO Cash Salary and Bonus for 1986 
LASSETS = Natural logarithm of the average of total assets for the period 
1984-1986. 
PRATE = Average of profit rate (accounting profits divided by sales) for the 
period 1984-1986. 
LHERF = Natural logarithm of the Herfmdahl index of stock dispersion for 1986. 
*Significant at the 1 % level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 2 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS AND CEO SALARY & BONUS VALUES 
BY INDUSTRY 
Regression Results: Cash Salary and Bonus for the CEOs in the Chemical (N=26), Drug 
(N=24), Petroleum (N=29), and Steel (N=10) industries. 
Variables 
Estimated Coefficients 
(T-Ratios) 
Chemical Drug Petroleum Steel 
Industry Industry Industry Industry 
N=26 N = 24 N=29 N= 10 
(Mean) (Mean) (Mean) (Mean) 
[T-Ratio] [T-Ratio] [T-Ratio] [T-Ratio] 
INTERCEPT -210.743 -815 422 -913-828 271.422 
LHERF -148.847 -98.408 -64.798 109.156 
(2.622) (2.436) (2.569) (2.646) 
[-1.938] [-.823] [-.943] [.987] 
LASSETS 432.000 556.682 492.353 7.535 
(3-408) (3.236) (3.782) (3.372) 
[5.037]* [4.268]* [6.725]* [.052] 
PRATE -315.338 289.158 -480.371 166.769 
(.0812) (.1592) (.0459) (.080) 
[-.681] [.617] [-.672] [.209] 
F-Ratio 10.514 13.204 17.904 .362 
R-Sq Adj .5331 .6142 .6443 -.2704 
Average 
Salary & Bonus $845,269 $792,416 $759,621 $559,000 
Maximum 1,488,000 1,269,000 1,577,000 825,000 
Minimum 408,000 305,000 200,000 412,000 
* Significant at the 1% level. 
Table 3 
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Regression Results: Cash Salary & Bonus for the CEOs in the Chemical, Drug, 
Petroleum, and Steel industries (1986). 
Independent Estimated Coefficients 
Variables (T-ratio) 
INTERCEPT -167.2230* 
LASSETS 353.6565 
(7.187)* 
CEO-OWN -20.3690 
(-1.844)*** 
LHERF -105.6952 
(-2.216)** 
R-Squared Adjusted = .4513 
F-Ratio = 25.126 * 
N = 89 
Dependent Variable = CEO Cash Salary and Bonus for 1986 
LASSETS = Natural logarithm of the average of total assets for the period 
1984-1986. 
CEO-OWN = Stockownership of the CEO as a percentage of the total outstanding 
shares for 1986. 
LHERF = Natural logarithm of the Herfmdahl index of stock dispersion for 1986. 
*Significant at the 1 % level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 10% level. 
